133 research outputs found

    Risk-bounded formation of fuzzy coalitions among service agents.

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    Cooperative autonomous agents form coalitions in order ro share and combine resources and services to efficiently respond to market demands. With the variety of resources and services provided online today, there is a need for stable and flexible techniques to support the automation of agent coalition formation in this context. This paper describes an approach to the problem based on fuzzy coalitions. Compared with a classic cooperative game with crisp coalitions (where each agent is a full member of exactly one coalition), an agent can participate in multiple coalitions with varying degrees of involvement. This gives the agent more freedom and flexibility, allowing them to make full use of their resources, thus maximising utility, even if only comparatively small coalitions are formed. An important aspect of our approach is that the agents can control and bound the risk caused by the possible failure or default of some partner agents by spreading their involvement in diverse coalitions

    Професорові П.Ю. Гриценку шістдесят

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    У ці світлі осінні дні наукова спільнота святкує славний ювілей — 60-річчя директора Інституту української мови Національної академії наук України, завідувача відділу діалектології, доктора філологічних наук, професора Павла Юхимовича Гриценка

    Multiagent cooperation for solving global optimization problems: an extendible framework with example cooperation strategies

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    This paper proposes the use of multiagent cooperation for solving global optimization problems through the introduction of a new multiagent environment, MANGO. The strength of the environment lays in itsflexible structure based on communicating software agents that attempt to solve a problem cooperatively. This structure allows the execution of a wide range of global optimization algorithms described as a set of interacting operations. At one extreme, MANGO welcomes an individual non-cooperating agent, which is basically the traditional way of solving a global optimization problem. At the other extreme, autonomous agents existing in the environment cooperate as they see fit during run time. We explain the development and communication tools provided in the environment as well as examples of agent realizations and cooperation scenarios. We also show how the multiagent structure is more effective than having a single nonlinear optimization algorithm with randomly selected initial points

    Computing optimal coalition structures in polynomial time

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    The optimal coalition structure determination problem is in general computationally hard. In this article, we identify some problem instances for which the space of possible coalition structures has a certain form and constructively prove that the problem is polynomial time solvable. Specifically, we consider games with an ordering over the players and introduce a distance metric for measuring the distance between any two structures. In terms of this metric, we define the property of monotonicity, meaning that coalition structures closer to the optimal, as measured by the metric, have higher value than those further away. Similarly, quasi-monotonicity means that part of the space of coalition structures is monotonic, while part of it is non-monotonic. (Quasi)-monotonicity is a property that can be satisfied by coalition games in characteristic function form and also those in partition function form. For a setting with a monotonic value function and a known player ordering, we prove that the optimal coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devise such an algorithm using a greedy approach. We extend this algorithm to quasi-monotonic value functions and demonstrate how its time complexity improves from exponential to polynomial as the degree of monotonicity of the value function increases. We go further and consider a setting in which the value function is monotonic and an ordering over the players is known to exist but ordering itself is unknown. For this setting too, we prove that the coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devise such an algorithm

    Two-Sided Parameter Learning of Role Selections for Efficient Team Formation

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    Multiple Objective Robot Coalition Formation

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